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THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO COURT-STRIPPING 
by 
Michael J. Gerhardt" 
This Article is part of a colloquy between Professor Michael J. Gerhardt 
and Professor Martin Redish about the constitutionality of court-stripping 
measures. Court-stripping measures are laws restricting federal court 
jurisdiction over particular subject matters. In particular, the authors 
discuss the constitutionality of the Marriage Protection Act of 2004. 
Professor Gerhardt argues that the Act is unconstitutional and threatens to 
destroy the principles of separation of powers, federalism and due process. 
It prevents Supreme Court review of Congressional action and hinders the 
uniformity and finality of constitutional law. Furthermore, the Act violates 
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause as it burdens a suspect class (gays and lesbians) by restricting their 
access to the federal courts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is an enormous privilege to participate in a colloquy with Professor 
Martin Redish on a subject of great constitutional importance in this inaugural 
issue of the Lewis & Clark Law Review. Our colloquy focuses on the 
constitutionality of what are commonly called court-stripping measures-laws 
removing some or all federal jurisdiction over some subject matter(s). Such 
laws have long been thought to raise profound questions of constitutional law. 
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In particular, they raise questions about the extent to which Congress's 
authority to regulate federal jurisdiction is constrained or limited by either 
Article III, which sets forth the jurisdiction of the federal courts, or by any 
other constitutional provisions, such as the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In spite of the difficulty of comprehensively clarifying the precise scope of 
Congress's power to regulate federal jurisdiction, I do not believe that the 
constitutionality of the bill approved earlier this year by the House of 
Representatives (hereafter referred to as "the Act"), which removed all federal 
jurisdiction over cases involving the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, is in 
doubt. 1 The Act, in my judgment, is clearly unconstitutional. The jurisdictional 
theory supporting the bill-that Congress has practically limitless authority to 
insulate its laws from Supreme Court and other Article III review-portends 
the destruction of judicial review itself. The theory underlying the Act would 
allow Congress to insulate every law it passes from federal judicial review. It 
would reduce the power of the United States Supreme Court to say what the 
law is with respect to the constitutionality of congressional legislation to a 
nullity. But this is not all. The Act goes further, and offends the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by forcing 
gays and lesbians-the only people likely to have standing to challenge either 
the Defense of Marriage Act or the Act-to litigate their claims under these 
acts differently than plaintiffs bringing claims under any other federal 
enactments. The Fifth Amendment patently forbids such disparate treatment. 
In my opinion, there is nothing magical about Congress's power to 
regulate federal jurisdiction. It is tempting to construe this power as unlimited, 
particularly if one consults only the text of Article III for possible limits. 
Federal courts scholars have long disagreed about whether there is any 
language in Article III restraining, or imposing what are commonly called 
"internal" constraints, on Congress's power to regulate federal jurisdiction. 2 
But it is a major mistake to read Article III as if the only constraints on it were 
those set forth originally in Article III. It is a mistake to read it as if it were not 
affected by subsequent constitutional amendments. Both the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause3 and its equal protection component constrain how 
Congress may withdraw federal jurisdiction. There is no question, for instance, 
that it may not pass a law forcing African-Americans or women to litigate some 
or all of their constitutional claims in state courts without any possibility of 
review in the Supreme Court, while leaving everyone else access to Article III 
courts for their constitutional claims. Such a law would be subject to 
heightened scrutiny and lacks any substantial or compelling justification. 
It should go without saying that Congress has no unlimited powers. Nor, 
for that matter, are the powers of any other constitutional actors unlimited. 
Congress's power to regulate federal jurisdiction is subject to the same 
1 See Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 1 08th Cong. (2004 ). 
2 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, ConstitUtional Limitations on Congressional Power to 
Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 143 (1982); 
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An 
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895 (1984). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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constitutional limitations as every other plenary power of Congress, even those 
pertaining to war. Surely, the power to regulate federal jurisdiction is not 
broader than the war powers, which Justice O'Connor declared were not a 
"blank check" to do as Congress or the President pleases.4 The power to 
regulate federal jurisdiction is no less a blank slate; it is subject, like every 
other congressional power is subject, to separation of powers and federalism 
constraints and to the individual rights guarantees set forth in the Bill of Rights. 
An especially troubling aspect of the Act is that it appears to lack any 
legitimate objective. At the very least, the Fifth Amendment requires that 
every congressional enactment must at least have a legitimate objective/ but it 
is hard to find one for the Act. Indeed, it is hard to find even a rational basis 
for the Act. It appears to be openly motivated by hostility to gays, lesbians, and 
the federal judiciary. But the Court, more than once in recent years, has 
declared laws void for being motivated by animus against gays and lesbians.6 
Nor is distrust of, or hostility to, the federal judiciary likely to pass 
constitutional muster. Under our constitutional system, the federal judiciary is 
integral to protecting the rule of law in our legal system, protecting the balance 
of power among the branches, and protecting unpopular minorities from the 
tyranny of the majority. 
For good reason, the Supreme Court has never upheld efforts to use the 
regulatory power over federal jurisdiction to regulate substantive constitutional 
law, to undermine the power of judicial review, or to overrule constitutional 
precedents of Article III courts. The benefits of our constitutional systems of 
separation of powers, federalism, and due process far outweigh whatever their 
costs. They further dictate that a law stripping all federal jurisdiction over 
challenges to the federal Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional. 
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
A few general principles should guide our consideration of the 
constitutionality of the Act. I discuss each briefly before considering how the 
Act threatens each of them. 
A. The Constitution Restricts the Means by Which Article III Courts' 
Constitutional Decisions May Be Overturned 
The United States Constitution allows the decisions of Article III courts on 
constitutional issues to be overturned by two means and two means only. The 
first is by a constitutional amendment. Article V of the Constitution sets forth 
the requirements for amending the Constitution.7 In our history, constitutional 
amendments have overruled only a few constitutional decisions, including both 
4 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004). 
5 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,488 (1955). 
6 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574, 578 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 635 (1996). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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the Eleventh Amendment8 and the Fourteenth Amendment.9 Thus, it would not 
be constitutional for Congress to enact a statute to overrule a federal court's 
decision on constitutional law. For instance, it would be unconstitutional for 
Congress to seek to overrule any Article III court's decision on the Second 
Amendment by means of a statute. 
The second means for displacing an erroneous constitutional decision is by 
a superior court's reversal or by a court's overruling one of its own decisions. 
Since the Constitution places the Supreme Court at the apex of the federal 
judicial system, it has no superior; it is the only Article III court that may 
overturn its constitutional decisions. And it has done so expressly in more than 
one hundred of its constitutional decisions. 10 On countless other occasions, the 
Court has modified, clarified, but not overruled its prior decisions on 
constitutional law. It is perfectly legitimate to ask the Supreme Court-or any 
other Article III court, for that matter-to reconsider one of its constitutional 
decisions. 
It follows that Congress may not, even through the exercise of its plenary 
power to regulate federal jurisdiction, overrule a federal court's decision on 
constitutional law or require inferior courts not to follow it. Nor, for that 
matter, may Congress direct the Court to ignore, or not to rely on, or make 
reference to, some of its constitutional opinions. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has long recognized that Congress may not use its power to regulate 
jurisdiction-or, for that matter, any other of its powers-in an effort to 
override substantive judicial decisions. 11 Efforts taken in response to, or 
retaliation against, judicial decisions to withdraw all federal jurisdiction are 
transparent attempts to influence, or displace, substantive judicial outcomes. 
For several decades, Congress, for good reason, has refrained from enacting 
such laws; and it has never previously enacted a law that withdraws all federal 
jurisdiction over particular constitutional claims. 
Moreover, proposals that would limit the methods available to Article III 
courts to remedy constitutional injuries are constitutionally problematic. The 
problem with such restrictions is that, as the Task Force of the Courts Initiative 
of the Constitution Project found, "remedies are essential if rights are to have 
meaning and effect."' Indeed, the bipartisan Task Force was unanimous: 
"[T]here are constitutional limits on the ability of legislatures to preclude 
remedies. At the federal level, where the Constitution is interpreted to vest 
individual rights, it is unconstitutional for Congress to preclude the courts from 
effectively remedying deprivations of those rights. " 13 While Congress clearly 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (overturning Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 
(1793)). 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
10 LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 194-206 (3d ed. 2003). 
11 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Dickerson v. United States, 
530 U.S. 428 (2000); and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
12 Citizens for Independent Courts Task Force on the Role of the Legislature in Setting 
the Power and Jurisdiction of the Courts, Balancing Act: Legislative Power and Judicial 
Independence, in UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA'S COURTS 205, 219 (2000) 
[hereinafter Balancing Act: Legislative Power and Judicial Independence]. 
13 /d. 
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may use its power to regulate jurisdiction to provide for particular procedures 
and remedies in inferior federal courts, it may do so in order to increase the 
efficiency of Article III courts, not to undermine those courts. Congress needs 
a neutral reason for procedural or remedial reform. Indeed, the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause requires Congress to have a neutral 
justification, or legitimate objective, for every piece of legislation that it 
enacts. 14 While national security and promoting the efficiency of the federal 
courts plainly qualify as neutral justifications, hostility to gays, lesbians, and 
federal judges does not. 
B. Constitutional Precedents Have the Status of Constitutional Law 
It is tempting to think that when the Supreme Court makes a mistake in a 
constitutional decision, that mistake is not accorded the status of constitutional 
law. The mistake is to yield to this temptation. The fact is that the major 
sources of constitutional meaning-text, original understanding, historical 
practice, and structure-support treating all the Supreme Court's constitutional 
opinions as constitutional law, which may only be altered by either a 
constitutional amendment or the Court's change of mind. 
First, the Constitution extends "[t]he judicial Power" of the United States 
over certain "[ c ]ases" or "[ c ]ontroversies."15 Judicially decided cases or 
controversies constitute precedents. Article V sets forth the requirements for 
the ratifications of amendments overturning erroneous precedents. 16 The fact 
that amendments have been chronologically added to the Constitution, rather 
than integrated within the original text with appropriate deletions, suggests that 
constitutional law remains static unless or until such time as amendments are 
ratified. 
Second, "[t]he judicial Power" set forth in Article III of the Constitution 
was historically understood to include a power to create precedents of some 
degree of binding force. In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton specifically 
referred to rules of precedent and their essential connection to the judicial 
power of the United States: "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is 
indis~ensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents . . 
. ." 
7 Indeed, legal scholars have found that the doctrine of precedent either 
was established or becoming established in state courts by the time of the 
'
4 See, e.g. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) ("[T]he guarantees of due 
process ... have in this country 'become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation."') 
(quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884))(Harlan, dissenting); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the 
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment"); Minn. Bd. for Cmty. Colis. v. Knight, 465 
U.S. 271, 291 (1984) (explaining that statutes which do not impinge constitutional rights 
must "rationally further a legitimate [government] purpose"). 
15 U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. l. 
16 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
17 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ). 
352 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:2 
Constitutional Convention. 18 The framers, in other words, were familiar with 
reliance on precedent as a source of constitutional decision. 
Third, historical practices uniformly support treating Supreme Court 
precedents on constitutional matters as constitutional law that are unalterable 
except through extraordinary constitutional mechanisms. As one of my friends 
who is a distinguished critic of the doctrine of stare decisis has acknowledged, 
"[t]he idea that '[t]he judicial Power' establishes precedents as binding law, 
obligatory in future cases, appears to have been an early-nineteenth-century 
innovation, perhaps presaged by certain Marshall Court opinions."19 Another 
commentator recently found that the framers rejected "the notion of a 
diminished standard of deference to constitutional precedent" as distinguished 
from common-law precedents. 20 Justice Joseph Story agreed that the 
"conclusive effect of [constitutional adjudication] was in the full view of the 
Framers of the Constitution."21 
Fourth, constitutional structure supports the status of constitutional 
precedents as constitutional law. As one of the nation's foremost authorities on 
constitutional law and federal jurisdiction, Richard Fallon of Harvard Law 
School, has observed: 
Under the Constitution, the judiciary, like the executive branch, has 
certain core powers not subject to congressional regulation under the 
· Necessary and Proper Clause. For example, it is settled that the judicial 
power to resolve cases encompasses a power to invest judgments with 
"finality;" congressional legislation purporting to reopen final judgments 
therefore violates Article III. And there can be little doubt that the 
Constitution makes Supreme Court precedents binding on lower courts. 
If higher court precedents bind lower courts, there is no structural 
anomaly in the view that judicial precedents also enjoy limited 
constitutional authority in the courts that rendered them. 22 
It follows that any attempt by Congress to diiute the authority of Supreme 
Court opinions on constitutional law within the federal court system would be 
plainly unconstitutional. Congress could not, for instance, enact a law directing 
the Supreme Court either to ignore its precedents on abortion rights as a source 
of decision altogether or to forego ever reconsidering certain Eleventh 
Amendment precedents. Either enactment would be unconstitutional, and each 
18 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860, at 8-9 (1977); see also Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From 
the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REv. 647, 659 (1999) ("Legal 
historians generally agree that the doctrine of stare decisis [was] of relatively recent origin" 
at the time of the Founding and had begun to resemble its modern form only during the 
eighteenth century.). 
19 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove 
the Precedential Effect ofRoe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1578 n.115 (2000). 
20 Lee, supra note.18, at 718. 
21 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES§ 378 
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed., WilliamS. Hein & Co. 1994) (1891). 
22 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on 
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 570, 580-81 (2001) (footnotes and citations 
omitted). 
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would be unconstitutional for the same reason: each would seek to provide a 
means by which a Supreme Court decision on constitutional law may be diluted 
through a statute, rather than the constitutionally permissible means of 
constitutional amendment or subsequent Supreme Court decision-making. 
C. The Supreme Court is Essential for Ensuring the Uniformity and Finality of 
Constitutional Law 
Referring to the Court's decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,23 Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked, "I do not think the United States would 
come to an end if we [judges] lost our power to declare an Act of Congress 
void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that 
declaration as to the laws of the several States."24 Without the authority to 
review state court judgments on federal law recognized in Martin (and ever 
since), there would be no means by which to ensure uniformity and finality in 
the application of federal law across the United States. This would be 
particularly disastrous for constitutional law. Federal rights, for instance, 
would cease to mean the same thing in every state. States could dilute or refuse 
to recognize these rights without any fear of reversal; they would have no 
incentive to follow the same constitutional law. Indeed, many state court 
judges are subject to majoritarian pressure to rule against federal rights, 
particularly those whose enforcement would result in a diminishment of state 
sovereignty. The Fourteenth Amendment would amount to nothing if Congress 
were to leave to state courts alone the discretion to recognize and vindicate the 
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.25 Judicial review within the 
federal courts is indispensable to the uniform, resolute, and final application of 
federal rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, this Act, 
limiting jurisdiction over the Defense of Marriage Act, allows the highest 
courts in each of the fifty states to become the courts of last resort within the 
federal judicial system for interpreting, enforcing, and adjudicating certain 
claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Act allows different 
state courts to reach different conclusions regarding the viability of various 
claims differently, without any possibility of review in a higher tribunal to 
resolve conflicts among the states. Thus, the Act precludes any finality and 
uniformity across the nation in the enforcement and interpretation of the 
affected rights. 
An equally troubling aspect of this Act is its implications for the future of 
judicial review. The Constitution does not allow Congress to vest jurisdiction 
in courts to enforce a law, but prohibit it from considering the constitutionality 
of the law that it is enforcing. The Task Force of the Courts Initiative of the 
Constitution Project unanimously concluded that "the Constitution's structure 
would be compromised if Congress could enact a law and immunize that law 
23 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
24 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 
295-06 (1920). 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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from constitutional judicial review."26 For instance, it would be 
unconstitutional for a legislature to assign the courts to enforce a criminal 
statute but preclude them from deciding the constitutionality of the law. It 
would be equally unlawful to immunize any piece of federal legislation from 
judicial review. If Congress could immunize its laws from the Court's power 
of judicial review, then Congress could use this power to insulate every piece 
offederallegislation from Supreme Court review. If Congress could immunize 
all federal laws from federal judicial review, it would eviscerate the Court's 
power to say what the law is with respect to the constitutionality of those laws. 
And, if Congress had the power to immunize all of its laws from judicial 
review, it is unclear why it then could not also immunize all or some state laws. 
from judicial review by the Supreme Court. The end result would be the 
destruction of the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. 
In addition, courts must have the authority to enjoin ongoing violations of 
constitutional law. For example, Congress may not preclude courts from 
enjoining laws that violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of 
speech. If an Article III court concludes that a federal law violates 
constitutional law, it would shirk its duty if it failed to declare the inconsistency 
between the law and the Constitution and proceed accordingly. 
Proposals to exclude all federal jurisdiction would, if enacted, open the 
door to another, equally disastrous constitutional result-allowing Congress to 
command the federal courts on how they should resolve constitutional 
questions. In United States v. Klein, 27 the Supreme Court declared that it 
seems to us that it is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of 
Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate 
power . . . . What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a 
cause in a particular way? . . . Can we do so without allowing that the 
legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department or 
the government in cases pending before it? We think not. ... We must 
think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the 
legislature from the judicial power. 
The law at issue in United States v. Klein attempted to foreclose the 
intended effect of both a presidential pardon and an earlier Supreme Court 
decision recognizing that effect. The Court struck the law down. In all 
likelihood, the same outcome would arise with respect to any other law 
excluding all federal jurisdiction, for such a law is no different than a law 
commanding the courts to uphold the law in question, a command no doubt 
Article III courts would strike down even if they thought the law in question 
was constitutional. There is no constitutionally meaningful difference between 
these laws, because the effect of a law excluding all federal jurisdiction over 
some federal law and a command for the courts to uphold the law is the same-
the law faces little risk of being completely overturned on constitutional 
grounds. 
26 Balancing Act: Legislative Power and Judicial Independence, supra note 12, at 217. 
27 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146--47 (1871). 
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III. THE ACT VIOLATES SEPARATION OF POWERS 
With the aforementioned principles in mind, I believe that the Act violates 
separation of powers in several ways. First, the Act violates the basic principle 
that Congress may not use its power to regulate jurisdiction to control 
substantive judicial outcomes. The obvious effect of a prohibition of all federal 
jurisdiction is to make it nearly impossible for the law to be struck down in 
every part of the United States. The jurisdictional restriction seeks to increase 
the likelihood that the federal statute will not be fully struck down. 
Second, the Act undermines the Supreme Court's ability to ensure the 
uniformity and finality of constitutional adjudication. The Court's essential 
functions include ensuring finality and uniformity across the United States in 
the enforcement and interpretation of federal law. In effect, the Act allows the 
highest courts in each of the fifty states to become courts of last resort for 
interpreting, enforcing, or adjudicating challenges to the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act. This allows for the possibility that different state courts will 
render different interpretations of the federal law and different conclusions 
regarding the constitutionality of the Act, without any possible review in a 
higher tribunal. 
Separation of powers constrains Congress from regulating federal 
jurisdiction in a way that eviscerates an essential function of the Supreme 
Court-namely, to say what the Jaw is with respect to the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act. Imagine, for instance, Congress withdraws all federal 
jurisdiction with respect to a particular constitutional claim or a set of 
constitutional claims. If only state courts retained the power to review 
congressional laws, then it is likely that such laws would be enforced and 
construed differently throughout the country. The absence of finality and 
uniformity in the enforcement and interpretation of federal law violates 
separation of powers because it robs Article III courts, particularly the Supreme 
Court, of an essential function--ensuring the finality and uniformity in the 
enforcement and interpretation of federal law in the United States. The 
Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessei8 upheld the necessity 
for judicial review by the Supreme Court to keep states from undermining 
federal law. If Congress could simply avoid compliance with a constitutional 
directive of an Article III court through its power to regulate jurisdiction, then 
every law could evade constitutional judicial review. Congress would simply 
insulate every single one of its laws from judicial review in Article III courts. 
Under the same logic, it could insulate every state law from judicial review. I 
cannot imagine that the Constitution would allow for such an easy method of 
destroying judicial review altogether. 
At least one tenable response to these problems might be that there is no 
constitutional requirement of federal jurisdiction over challenges to the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act in the first instance. The Act withdraws federal 
jurisdiction over a subject over which the Constitution does not require federal 
jurisdiction. If Congress does not have to authorize federal jurisdiction over 
28 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 304. 
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the Act, then, one might argue, it ought to be able to withdraw it if Congress 
sees fit. The authority to regulate jurisdiction includes the powers both to 
create and to withdraw jurisdiction. Indeed, through most of our history, 
including the years immediately following ratification, Congress did not grant 
the Court jurisdiction over every case or controversy involving a constitutional 
claim. The Act merely withdraws a grant of jurisdiction to restore, in one area, 
a circumstance that is consistent with the Constitution-the absence of judicial 
review over this particular federal law. 
The problem with this response is that it fails to appreciate the significant 
difference between vesting and withdrawing federal jurisdiction over a 
constitutional subject matter. Vesting federal jurisdiction is one thing, but 
withdrawing jurisdiction previously granted is quite another. Congress may be 
using the same power to do each of these things, but each has very different 
constitutional consequences. While it is not clear that the Constitution requires 
an Article III forum be available to adjudicate certain claims, 29 it is clear that 
withdrawing particular subject matter jurisdiction will subject certain 
constitutional claimants and claims to disparate treatment. 30 I explain in the 
29 Academics hotly dispute whether there are any internal constraints on the powers to 
abolish or withdraw jurisdiction, i.e., whether any of the provisions in Article III restrict 
these powers. Article III conceivably limits Congress's power to regulate federal jurisdiction 
in at least two ways (both discussed in Professor Redish's written statement and amply 
elsewhere in the literature on federal jurisdiction). Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. 
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE 
L.J. 455, 465 (1986); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.3 (4th ed. 
2003). Justice Story suggested in Martin that Article III's provisions constrain the power to 
regulate federal jurisdiction. He argued that at the very least the text of Article III, by its use 
of the word "shall," ought to vest the entire judicial power of the United States, in original or 
appellate form, in some Article III court. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 330--31. He read the vesting 
clause of Article III as a mandate. Professor Amar at Yale Law School refines Story's 
argument. Alternatively, he argues that the text indicates that only three categories of 
cases-those preceded in Article III's text by the word "all" --ought to be vested in at least 
one Article III court in some form, original or appellate. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist 
View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 
261-62 (1985). 
30 One defense of the Act is that Congress's power to create or abolish inferior tribunals 
includes the authority to curtail their jurisdiction as it sees fit. There are two major problems 
with this argument vis-a-vis the Act. First, while the same constitutional limitations apply to 
Congress's powers to abolish and withdraw jurisdiction, they may apply differently because 
these powers have different effects. Abolition tends to have a general impact, while 
withdrawal may have a general or more particular effect. Abolishing a single seat in a district 
that has been vacated is not likely to be constitutionally problematic because at least some 
district judges persist in exercising Article III power within that district. But abolishing an 
entire district could severely compromise the constitutional entitlements of U.S. citizens 
within the district, depending on which district has been abolished and the alternative 
remaining fora. If, for instance, Congress abolished a state's only district, then the citizens of 
that state have been left in a precarious circumstance with respect to their federal claims. 
Recall that a major premise of Article III is that state courts lack the trustworthiness and 
expertise that Article III courts have in handling federal interests and claims. If state courts 
were to remain the only forum available for vindicating particular constitutional or federal 
claims (because of abolition or withdrawal), the constitutional or federal claims of the 
affected residents would be compromised. This is especially true if the effect of a 
congressional law is to leave state courts as the residents' only fora for adjudicating their 
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next section in greater detail why this disparate treatment violates the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause. 
IV. THE ACT VIOLATES THE FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE 
I am convinced that the Act violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause. First, it violates the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.31 The Court will subject any classifications 
that explicitly burden a suspect class or fundamental right to strict scrutiny. A 
federal law withdrawing all federal jurisdiction over a particular federal law or 
related constitutional questions has the potential to do both. A law 
withdrawing federal jurisdiction has a different effect and purpose than one that 
foreclosed federal jurisdiction over the same subject in the first place. It is, in 
federal or constitutional claims, in retaliation against particular substantive judicial 
decisions. 
The difference between abolition and withdrawal is particularly clear in the equal 
protection context. Here, it might be useful to consider a possible analogy to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971 ). In that case, the Court upheld 
a city's decision to close its public pools rather than open them to African-Americans. The 
city responded by abolishing its public pools. Some local governments responded to the 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education by closing their schools rather than opening them 
to African-American children. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The decision was constitutional because 
it was a facially neutral classification with a disproportionate impact. Such a classification is 
usually subject only to the rational basis test. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 115-16 (1996) 
("Absent a fundamental interest or classification attracting heightened scrutiny . . . the 
applicable equal protection standard is that of rational justification.") (internal quotations 
omitted). It is constitutional to abolish a public pool or even a public school, because that is a 
facially neutral classification likely to satisfy the rational basis test because it can be 
defended as saving money. The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that a facially neutral 
classification is not always subject to a rational basis test. If such a classification were to 
have an overwhelming or uniformly disproportionate impact against a particular racial 
minority, then it is subject to strict scrutiny. The Court said as much in both Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), cases in 
which the Court applied strict scrutiny to facially neutral classifications with an almost 100% 
disproportionate impact against racial minorities. 
I am sure you would agree that it would be unconstitutional to close a public pool or 
school only to African-American or Jewish children, because the closure would no longer be 
facially neutral but instead be a race-based or faith-based classification, either of which 
would trigger strict scrutiny. If Congress were to abolish a seat or two on a circuit court 
because it believes that the caseload within that circuit no longer justifies filling all its seats, 
then it has effectively enacted a facially neutral statute with respect to that circuit. It also has 
a rational basis for that facially neutral classification, namely, preserving fiscal resources and 
streamlining the administration of justice. If, however, the Congress were to withdraw 
jurisdiction on the basis of a classification directed against African-Americans or Jews for 
particular claims unique to their respective classes, that would pose a serious equal 
protection problem. The Court has held that strict scrutiny is appropriate with respect to 
race-specific subjects (so that a state's decision to override a locality's decision to require 
busing children as a means to facilitate integration was subjected to strict scrutiny). Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1971). 
31 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (recognizing, inter alia, that congruence 
requires the federal government to follow the same constitutional standard as the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause requires states to follow). 
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other words, a very different matter to restrict jurisdiction over a subject matter 
that Congress has never directed should fall within federal jurisdiction than to 
withdraw jurisdiction previously granted by Congress with respect to some 
subject matter. A fatal difficulty with the Act is that it is withdrawing 
jurisdiction that previously and otherwise had been authorized with respect to 
the constitutionality of the Act. 
To further appreciate how the withdrawal of jurisdiction (rather than the 
restriction of jurisdiction in the first place) poses equal protection problems, it 
is useful to remember when strict scrutiny is triggered under the Fifth 
Amendment. First, it may be based on a suspect classification. For instance, a 
jurisdictional regulation restricting access by African-Americans, or a 
particular religious group, to Article III courts to vindicate certain interests 
ostensibly because of mistrust of "unelected judges" plainly lacks a compelling 
justification and thus violates the equal protection component of the Due 
Process Clause. 
While the usual constitutional measure of a jurisdictional regulation is the 
rational basis test, a court (indeed, even a state court) might find that even that 
test has not been satisfied if it finds that the argument in support of burdening 
African-Americans, women, or Jews is illegitimate. While the Court has not 
employed strict scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality of laws burdening gays 
and lesbians, the Court has found two such laws fail to satisfy even the rational 
basis test. A court analyzing whether a classification precluding a gay or 
lesbian citizen from petitioning any Article III court-and the only people 
likely to have standing to challenge the Act would be gays or lesbians 
interested in marrying-would probably conclude that such a restriction is no 
more rational than the classification struck down by the Supreme Court in 
Romer v. Evans. In Romer, the Court found that the state referendum 
disadvantaging gays and lesbians failed to pass the rational basis test, because it 
had been motivated by animus.32 The Court reached a similar conclusion in 
Lawrence v. Texas,33 striking down the criminalization of homosexual sodomy. 
In all likelihood, a majority of the Supreme Court would strike down a measure 
such as the Act as having been driven by the same illegitimate concerns that it 
rejected in both Romer and Lawrence. 
A federal law withdrawing all federal jurisdiction may also run afoul of 
the Fifth Amendment by violating a fundamental right. Such is the case with a 
proposal restricting all federal jurisdiction over flag burning or school prayer. 
Such a law would leave those rights vulnerable to varying state court 
interpretations. It is unlikely that the Court would find a compelling 
justification for burdening fundamental rights in that manner. Nor can I 
imagine that the Court would ever agree that distrusting "unelected judges" 
qualifies as a compelling justification. 
In addition, a proposal withdrawing all federal jurisdiction over a 
particular constitutional subject may violate the Fifth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause's guarantee of procedural fairness. Over a century ago, the 
32 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
33 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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Court declared that due process "is a restraint on the legislative as well as the 
executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be construed to 
leave congress free to make 'any due process of law,' by its mere will."34 For 
instance, the Court has explained "that the Due Process Clause protects civil 
litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as defendants ho~ing to protect 
their property or as plaintiffs seeking to redress grievances." 5 A proposal 
excluding all federal jurisdiction effectively denies a federal forum to plaintiffs 
whose constitutional interests have been impeded by the law, even though 
Article III courts, including the Supreme Court, have been designed to provide 
a special forum for the vindication of federal interests. 
Withdrawing all federal jurisdiction with respect to a particular 
constitutional claim forces litigants into state courts, which our Framers 
thought to be hostile or unsympathetic to federal interests. The Court declared 
as much in the classic case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.36 To the extent that 
the Act burdens federal constitutional rights, it is problematic both for the 
burdens it imposes and for violating due process. Basic due process requires 
independent judicial determinations of federal constitutional rights (including 
the "life, liberty, and property" interests protected explicitly by the Fifth 
Amendment). Because state courts are potentially (if not actually) hostile to 
federal interests and rights, and under some circumstances not open to claims 
based on federal rights, due process requires the availability of an Article III 
forum. 
Last but not least, as the authors of a leading casebook on federal 
jurisdiction have observed, "[a ]t least since the 1930s, no bill that has been 
interpreted to withdraw all federal court ~urisdiction with respect to a particular 
substantive area has become law."3 This refusal, like those against 
withdrawing all federal jurisdiction in a particular class of constitutional 
claims, constitutes a significant historical practice--even a tradition-that 
argues against, rather than for, withdrawing all jurisdiction over particular 
classes of constitutional claims. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE FURTHER BARS CONGRESS FROM 
ELIMINATING FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS AGAINST 
FEDERAL OFFICIALS 
Another aspect of federalism, to which I have alluded, is that it is not just 
concerned with protecting the states from federal encroachments. It also 
protects the federal government and officials from state encroachments. In a 
classic decision in Tarble 's Case, 38 the Supreme Court held that the 
Constitution precluded state judges from adjudicating federal officials' 
34 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 
(1856). 
35 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982). 
36 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 339 (1816). 
37 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 322 (5th ed. 2003). 
38 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397,411 (1871). 
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compliance with state habeas laws. The prospect of state judges exercising 
authority over federal officials is not consistent with the structure of the 
Constitution. They could then direct, or impede, the exercise of federal power. 
The Act, however, allows state courts to do this. By stripping all federal 
jurisdiction over certain claims against federal officials, the Act leaves only 
state courts with jurisdiction over claims brought against those officials. It 
further leaves only to the state courts enforcement of the provisions of the Bill 
pertaining to federal officials. 39 The popular will might lead state judges to be 
disposed to be hostile to federal claims or federal officials. Hostility to the 
federal claims poses problems with the Fifth Amendment, while hostility to 
federal officials poses serious federalism difficulties. 
Beyond the constitutional defects with the Act,40 it may not be good 
policy. It may send the wrong signals to the American people and to people 
around the world. It expresses hostility to our Article III courts, in spite of their . 
special function in upholding constitutional rights and enforcing and 
interpreting federal law. If a branch of our government demonstrates a lack of 
respect for federal courts, our citizens and citizens in other countries may have 
a hard time figuring out why they should do otherwise. Rejecting proposals to 
exclude all federal jurisdiction or inferior court jurisdiction for some 
constitutional claims extends an admirable tradition within Congress and 
reminds the world of our hard-won, justifiable confidence in the special role 
performed by Article III courts throughout our history in vindicating the rule of 
law. 
Separation of powers is a body of law based on inferences from the design 
of the Constitution. Separation of powers constrains the power to regulate 
federal jurisdiction (including abolishing some inferior Article III courts) in at 
least three ways: First, it constrains Congress from using this power to usurp 
the authority of the other branches in any way. Second, it constrains Congress 
from using this power in any way that undermines the functioning of Article III 
courts. Consequently, if Congress used its power to abolish inferior federal 
courts in an effort to retaliate against or to override their substantive 
constitutional decisions, that would violate separation of powers. Third, 
separation of powers constrains Congress from bypassing the constitutional 
requirements for achieving certain outcomes. For instance, the Supreme Court 
has recognized in its INS v. Chadha41 decision and the decision in Clinton v. 
City of New York42 that the presentment and bicameral clauses need to be 
satisfied in order for a bill to become a law. For instance, at the June 24th 
hearings, Professor Redish inquired about the nature of the separation of 
39 Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 1 08th Cong. § 2 (2004). 
40 Another bill pending before the House Judiciary Committee has, at least in my 
judgment, similar constitutional deficiencies. See Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, 
H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. §§ 101-102 (2004). Indeed the very name of the latter proposed bill 
indicates its purpose to displace certain Supreme Court decisions on constitutional law. 
41 462 u.s. 919,951 (1983). 
42 524 u.s. 417,421 (1998). 
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powers problem if Congress abolished an inferior court that was occupied.43 
Say, Congress abolished a particular judge's seat on the Ninth Circuit. This 
would completely undermine that particular judge's ability to exercise Article 
III power and thus to be an Article III judge. He would have no forum in which 
to exercise his power unless Congress reassigned his jurisdiction, i.e., assigned 
him-for some neutral reason-to exercise his authority elsewhere within the 
circuit. (Even then, there might still be an equal protection problem with why 
this judge has been singled out for disparate treatment.) Abolishing a particular 
judge's seat or perhaps an entire district deviates from the limited paths by 
which constitutional decisions of Article III courts may be overridden-by 
constitutional amendment or the Court's overruling itself. Moreover, if 
Congress abolished an inferior court that was occupied, it would be effectively 
removing an Article III judge without complying with the constitutional 
requirements for impeachment and removal of Article III judges. These 
requirements include impeachment by a majority of the House and a vote to 
remove by at least two-thirds of the Senate.44 
Moreover, separation of powers constrains Congress from regulating 
federal jurisdiction in a way that eviscerates an essential function of the 
Supreme Court. Imagine, for instance, that Congress withdraws all federal 
jurisdiction with respect to a particular constitutional claim or a set of 
constitutional claims. If only state courts retained the power to review 
congressional laws, then it is likely that such laws would be enforced and 
construed differently throughout the country. The absence of finality and 
uniformity in the enforcement and interpretation of federal law violates 
separation of powers because it robs Article III courts, particularly the Supreme 
Court, of an essential function--ensuring the finality and uniformity in the 
enforcement and interpretation of federal law in the United States. I read the 
Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, among other decisions, 
as directing such a result.45 If Congress could simply avoid compliance with a 
constitutional directive of an Article III court through its power to regulate 
jurisdiction, then every law could evade constitutional judicial review. 
Congress would simply insulate every single one of its laws from judicial 
review in Article III courts. 
Last, but not least, I think that at least two Supreme Court decisions from 
2004 reinforce the constitutional arguments I have made in this article and in 
the June 24, 2004 hearing.46 In particular, both decisions recognize that, as 
43 Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction to Protect Marriage for the States: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 
21 (2004) (statement of Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and 
Public Policy, Northwestern Law School). 
44 U.S. CONST. art. I,§§ 2-3. 
45 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 305 (1816); Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 582 (1842). 
46 See Rasul v. Bush, 124B S. Ct. 2686, 2699 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 
2633, 2635, 2650 (2004); Limiting Federal Court Jurisidction to Protect Marriage for the 
States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 14 (2004) (statement of Michael Gerhardt, Arthur B. Hanson 
Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School). 
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Justice O'Connor suggested, the war power is not a "blank check" and thus 
cannot justify restricting access altogether to an Article III court for an "enemy 
combatant" or, for that matter,. a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, to challenge the 
conditions of their detention.47 In my view, the power to regulate is also not a 
"blank check" to do as Congress pleases with respect to particular plaintiffs or 
particular constitutional or federal claims. 
47 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635, 2650. 
